As global energy tensions tighten supply, Eni CEO Claudio Descalzi urges the EU to rethink its 2027 Russian gas ban. The debate raises critical questions on energy security, prices, and long-term strategy.
Why the Russian gas ban EU 2027 is under pressure
Claudio Descalzi, CEO of Eni, has called for a suspension of the European Union’s planned ban on Russian gas imports set for 2027. Speaking in Rome, he argued that current geopolitical tensions, particularly in the Gulf and the disruption of the Strait of Hormuz, are tightening global oil and gas supply.
This shift is forcing importing countries to compete more aggressively for available cargoes, making it increasingly difficult for Europe to replace missing volumes in the short term.
In this context, Descalzi questions whether the timeline for phasing out Russian gas remains realistic, suggesting that alternatives are not yet sufficient.
The issue is twofold: ensuring short-term energy security while maintaining consistency with the EU’s long-term strategy to eliminate reliance on Russian gas. The debate now hinges on infrastructure, available volumes, and the adaptability of the energy system.
Hormuz disruption and global supply constraints
Descalzi described the Strait of Hormuz disruption as “the most important event of the last 40 years” for energy supply. He pointed to a significant imbalance in global markets, stressing that “the problem is not prices, it is volumes.”
According to the data cited, the market is missing 4.5 million barrels of refined products and 12 million barrels of crude oil. Over a single weekend, 600 Eni fuel stations reportedly ran out of diesel.
He also highlighted a growing distortion between markets: physical oil prices in Asia have reached 150 dollars per barrel, compared to 110 dollars in Atlantic paper markets. This gap is redirecting flows toward more profitable regions, making it harder for Europe to secure supplies.
Structural weaknesses further complicate the picture. “We do not have our own crude, we do not have strong refining capacity,” Descalzi noted, referring to the gradual decline of Europe’s energy industrial base. The continent imports around 35% of its jet fuel, while 36 refineries have closed in recent years.
The role of gas in Europe’s power system
Gas remains central to Europe’s electricity system. “For all power plants, flexibility on the grid is provided by gas,” Descalzi said, arguing that non-dispatchable renewables and nuclear cannot ensure the same responsiveness.
This reflects the structure of the European electricity market, where gas often sets the marginal price of power. In systems heavily dependent on gas, such as Italy, this dynamic directly affects electricity costs.
Descalzi also criticized what he sees as a rigid European approach, both on the Russian gas ban and the ETS system. “You cannot be radical and dogmatic about everything. This is an extraordinary situation,” he said, suggesting that energy policies should adapt to emergency conditions.
Is Europe really facing an energy emergency?
According to analysis by the think tank Bruegel, the European Union is not at immediate risk of a physical gas shortage. However, it must prepare for higher prices and intensified global competition.
In 2025, the EU spent €117 billion on gas imports. A doubling of prices could add around €100 billion to the energy bill over the following 12 months. High import dependency continues to limit Europe’s ability to respond autonomously.
Since 2022, the supply system has been restructured. LNG imports have increased significantly, with the United States becoming the main supplier. Yet this balance remains fragile, as cargoes can easily be redirected toward higher-paying Asian markets.
For African exporters, particularly in regions such as West Africa, this competition for LNG cargoes has already reshaped trade flows, highlighting how interconnected global gas markets have become.
LNG diversification and its limits
Europe has diversified its supply sources, including exporters from Africa and the Middle East. However, the room for further expansion is limited.
Qatar, for example, accounts for only 4% of total EU gas imports. Even small supply reductions can therefore influence global prices. At the same time, additional export capacity from the United States and Canada cannot quickly compensate for potential shortages.
This leaves Europe exposed to price shocks and competitive pressure, even without a direct supply crisis.
How much Russian gas still matters
Despite reduced pipeline flows, Russian LNG continues to play a significant role. In 2024, the EU imported 16.5 million tonnes from Yamal, equivalent to around 20 billion cubic meters, worth approximately €7.2 billion.
In 2025, Russia’s share of LNG imports stood at about 14%, down from 19% the previous year but still substantial. Imports continued in 2026, with 1.5 million tonnes recorded in February alone.
These figures illustrate why replacing Russian volumes entirely remains a complex short-term challenge.
Would delaying the Russian gas ban EU 2027 solve the problem?
Bruegel’s analysis points in the opposite direction to Descalzi’s proposal. Returning to Russian gas would risk rebuilding a dependency that Europe has spent years trying to reduce.
Reopening this channel could expose the EU again to price manipulation and geopolitical pressure. It could also slow investment in clean technologies by creating uncertainty around the energy transition.
The alternative approach focuses on reducing gas demand, accelerating electrification, and expanding renewables. Since 2021, European gas consumption has already fallen by around 20%, partly due to the uptake of technologies such as heat pumps.
Short-term levers: storage, prices and demand
In the near term, storage management remains a priority. The EU must reach storage levels between 80% and 90% before winter, yet levels in 2026 are lower than in previous years.
The cost of filling storage could reach €35 billion with gas prices at €60/MWh. Meanwhile, global demand remains strong, intensifying competition between Europe and Asia.
Policy responses are therefore focused on avoiding market distortions such as price caps or broad subsidies, while maintaining economic signals aligned with the energy transition.
The core issue is not only supply, but the structure of Europe’s energy system and its dependence on imports. The choice between delaying the ban or continuing diversification and demand reduction represents a strategic turning point.
The question remains open: how to secure short-term supply without undermining long-term energy security and the path toward a more resilient system.
